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ABSTRACT

This thesis will tender a rigorous analysis on the conjunction of the judgment creditors’
inherent right for satisfaction of their outstanding monetary judgments and the respective
detriments that judgment debtors confront as the party subject to satisfying the outstanding award
levied against them. To establish the theory that the civil justice system has “resuscitated” the
antebellum debtors’ prison and infringed upon principles of civil liberties, this thesis will expound
on evidence garnered throughout this study in a three-pronged analysis of economics, history, and
a reflection on the American legal systems. Resources will include, but not be limited to: law
journals, peer-reviewed materials, dissertations, congressional reports, and court cases.
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INTRODUCTION

Filing a lawsuit, regardless of its aim, is to formally “declare war” against another party
for the legal right to act, or not to act, in a specific circumstance. The courts have existed for the
purpose of determining what party deserves more justice than the other; that signifies that the
courts, as a branch of our tripartite government, stand to determine what is best for society. But
what if our court system fails to serve our society’s best interests? It is incumbent upon the
membership, those who are subjugated by the injustice, to rise up and denounce said injustice
because it is one of the many rights conferred to us by the Framers. In the scope of collections law,
particularly post-judgment matters, there lurks a form of injustice which allows for individuals to
be incarcerated for the nonpayment of debt. Given the wealth of authorities who have addressed
the issue ad nauseum, one would believe that a proper solution has been attained—sadly, even to
this day, we have not. Here we will discuss, in a three part analysis, why debtor incarceration
occurs, where we derived the laws and ideals that allowed it to happen, and the inherent issues
with legal systems.
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I.

ECONOMIC AILMENTS THAT PROMULGATE THE PERVASIVENESS
OF CIVIL SUITS AND THEIR INEXORABLE EFFECTS ON DEBTORS

Given that the economy is subservient to the whims and demands of society, during
financial turmoil, in the dominion of the civil legal system, litigation, like leavened bread,
augments as it is incited by extrinsic facets. The “yeast,” or economic detriments, is the catalyst
and agitator for the rise of litigation in contemporary society; it is the logical and licit avenue for
alleviating creditors’ financial shortcomings by petitioning the American judicature to mitigate
that loss by way of the Final Judgment. Increased civil litigation leads to an increase in monetary
judgments to be satisfied by the debtor, therefore a relative proportion of unsatisfied creditors seek
to retain collections attorneys to pursue delinquent debtors. For one to adequately grasp the notion
that the debtors’ prison has been gradually instilled in the civil legal system, one must be cognizant
of the measures creditors would pursue to secure the Satisfaction of Judgment from the judgment
debtor.
Judgments, as defined in Marriam-Webster’s Law Dictionary, are “a formal decision or
determination on a matter or case by a court.” Monetary judgments are no different, they simply
have a particular sum attached to them, for the aim of reinstating financial “wholeness” to the party
that faced a particular civil detriment. The monetary judgment is the legally recognized document
that provides the prevailing party in a suit a means to pursue the “defeated” party. Given that fact,
the judgment is inevitably the most basic building block for the creditor, and it is analogous to an
atom in the sense that it alone may symbolize recovery, but standing alone, it is a fairly feeble
document, regardless of the grandeur that the public, and practitioners, impute to it. Civil monetary
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judgments may be granted by the courts in various types of lawsuits, ranging from tort claims to
contractual breaches (these are just two example of a countless number of possibilities).
Notwithstanding, regardless of the grounds or circumstances for the filing of the initial complaint,
for the judgment to reach the ripe stage of Satisfaction, it requires the aid of many relevant
documents, like motions, writs, and forms, which reinforce the legal grounds that allow the creditor
to recover the balance represented on the judgment.
These documents are precursors to attaining that most coveted item (Satisfaction), in the
realm of post-judgment litigation, and which rest on the grounds that a Final Judgment was
awarded to begin with; without it, one may not have the capability to recover the amount “at issue”
in the initial complaint of the lawsuit. By awarding the Final Judgment, a party is formally declared
as a tortfeasor or wrongdoer by a court, therefore that court recognizes the amount suitable for
making the wronged party whole, at the very least, financially. If the creditor satisfied all the legal
prerequisites necessary for obtaining the Final Judgment, and has applied the reasonable means
(successfully) to recover the sum owed, the Satisfaction of Judgment would likely be in an
environment appropriate for its conception; the Satisfaction of Judgment is a required document
that is produced by the creditor, for the debtor, which denotes and formally recognizes that the
judgment has been fully “paid off,” hence the name Satisfaction is no vague misnomer. See
701.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). Said document is an official record that earmarks the finality of a
monetary judgment and effectively ends all litigation relative to the initial claim, though attaining
it is typically a taxing endeavor for those with the necessary resolve and resources to grasp that
non plus ultra.
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In the realm of macroeconomics, these money judgments tend to have curious roles when
one analyzes their frequency in our society. Certain trends may be found when one analyzes civil
lawsuits and their prominence relative to the health of the economy. It is found through this
analysis that periods of economic insecurity are one of the indicators that the lawsuits, hence
money judgments, tend to flourish from. Further, by this analysis, when the general economic
welfare of society diminishes, individuals tend to become more litigious when recessions end.
Why? Well, individuals with standing debts are more financially secure post recession, ergo they
have the willingness and wherewithal to pursue prior civil wrongdoings relative to the most recent
economic insecurity.
These individuals are more disposed to becoming litigious because quite frankly, during
the recession, they might not have had the means to pursue their debtors, and just as likely, the
zeal appropriate to commence such a straining venture. See Bradley D. Riel and Paul T.
Meiklejohn, A Correlation Between the State of the US Economy and Patent Litigation Activity §
95-97 (2010). The data of this study demonstrates clearly that legal services that are directly related
to recession incidents rises after a lengthy period, much after the recovery of the economy.
Therefore, particularly in the most recent data leading from the 2000’s onward, the presence of
recession related legal services is evident at a rate approximately twice as fast than before the
2000’s. (It can be reasonably deduced that litigation arises from these legal services, thus the rise
of legal services must positively correlate with the rise of civil litigation.) By applying this
“evidence” to a more contemporaneous circumstance, the 2008 housing market crash, which led
to a recession of unprecedented proportions, one may discover that the surplus of litigation
produced from this event relates profoundly with creditor-debtor relations. Judgment recovery is
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a product of these relations, and by illuminating the substance (claims) of the judgments that arose
from this recession, one may determine that the ramifications of collections law is not a foreign
element to this equation.
Based upon the influx of domestic insolvency due to the lax vetting of those qualified for
homeownership, lenders were compelled to take adverse action against their borrowers. Those
who were subject to loans outside of their financial capacities were patently incapable to
recompense their lenders (once loan interests rates conjoined with the principle balances lent), and
resulted in lenders filing lawsuits for the recovery of the defaulted loan. That delinquent loan is
solidified by method of judicial order, the Final Judgment, which endows that lender the means to
recover the judgment within a period of two decades, for most actions. (See Richard H.W. Maloy
and Cynthia Lynne, The Life of a Money Judgment in Florida is Limited—For Only Some
Purposes, 79 The Fla. L. J., 20 (2005), further reference and explanation on actions available to
the judgment creditor, and those that supersede the allotted period of two decades.) These
judgment wielding lenders, in the broad economic context, provide a formidable front against their
debtors. They enabled practitioners to recover the deficiencies not recuperated from property
foreclosure, and over time, the remaining unabated judgments were likely sold to third parties for
a fraction of their face value, simply because the debtor, at that time, was either insolvent or not
applicable for procedural Due Process because the creditor was unable to properly serve the debtor
and establish legal notice for the renewed action.
Assignment of the judgment, or the sale of a judgment, can reinvigorate prior fruitless
attempts to recover the debt by a new party that has had nothing to do with the initial matter at
contention. Via filing an Assignment of Judgment with the appropriate records keeper of the
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county, likely a comptroller’s office or official records department, a judgment creditor can
transfer a monetary judgment to another party, like the conveyance of a deed to real property by
way of selling that property. That assignee, i.e., the new judgment creditor, literally takes the place
of the original judgment creditor in all future proceedings and is allowed the selfsame legal rights
as the original judgment creditor; the assignee superimposes the assignor in all future litigation
and becomes the new and legally recognized party in the standing lawsuit. These assignees
reinstitute collections methods and continue off of the shortcomings of the prior judgment-holder.
Referencing Sammis v. Wightman, 31 Fla. 45 (1893) and Radio South Dade, Inc. v. Marrero, 572
So.2d 3 (1990), these cases reenforce the unalienable rights of the judgment assignee, that are then
recognized as the de facto, first party in a lawsuit. (Sammis, although its ruling dates well over a
century, its principles still present in contemporary law.) At this time, months, and just as
commonly, years have passed since the initial suit has not only been filed, but when the judgment
has been initially granted, allowing for legally allowable interest on these monetary judgments to
accumulate against the debtors in the interim.
Judgment debtors in this circumstance have likely been unaware of any prospect for rerecovery, especially in the latter possibility when significant delay exists between the recovery
efforts of the original creditor and the assignee of the judgment. As lapses in time occur, financial
situations are also typically dynamic, so it is in the interest of these assignees to await a particular
time to rekindle the judgment and conceive new actions, in the hope that the judgment debtor has
greater financial utility than when the initial judgment was awarded, plus the benefit of the
aforementioned accrued interest on the judgment. In that occurrence, the debtor, once located and
Service of Process satisfied, is thrown into litigation once again. Subject to this debt for twenty

6

years, joined with a practically indeterminate period of time that allotted for execution actions on
the judgment, if the judgment debtor fails to afford himself the luxury of retaining an attorney, to
facilitate the remittance of funds owed or to assert possible defenses to the pursing assignee, they
are then jostled to take the most drastic “out” available, bankruptcy (if the bankruptcy court
validates that the debtor merits such relief). Those that are not applicable to such financial
absolvement may be subject to recovery tactics like garnishments, property seizures, liens,
etcetera. However unfortunate these circumstances are, those recovery methods are not the most
radical that exist, for the looming fate of incarceration hangs in the balance of those who fail to
satiate the dogged drive of collectors.

7

II.

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE ANTEBELLUM DEBTORS’ PRISON
OF ENGLAND AND THE CONVEYANCE OF COMMON LAW TO THE
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CIVIL LEGAL SYSTEM

To demonstrate how the “contemporary debtors’ prison” has ridden on the coattails of the
bygone debtors’ prison, it is pertinent to understand the relevance of historical precedent. As
America’s debtor prisons have evolved from English Common Law and its punitive systems of
renumeration, it is significant to mention the underpinnings of such a system of
disenfranchisement. Imprisonment for debt is not a historical oddity. It is a profound and lengthy
tale that was conceived in the Medieval Period, and its recognition in formal English law in the
Industrial Age was also the product of purpose driven aims for mitigating civil grievances.
Testimonies of what once was denoted a system of “barbarous indulgence,” which became an
enabler for unfettering the animalistic capabilities of the human complexion. See C. Fane, Esq.,
Observations on the Proposed Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt on Mesne Process; Shewing Its
Probable Effects in Disabling Creditors from Forcing Their Debtors into Bankruptcy, Trust-deeds,
or Compositions. London: S. Sweet, Law Bookseller and Publisher pg. 16 (1838). As the English
author and philanthropist Dr. Samuel Johnson has aptly put:
“Surely, he whose debtor has perished in prison, although he may acquit himself of
deliberate murder, must at least have his mind clouded with discontent, when he considers
how much another has suffered from him; when he thinks on the wife bewailing her
husband, or the children begging the bread which their father would have earned. If there
are any made so obdurate by avarice or cruelty as to revolve these consequences without
dread or pity, I must leave them to be awakened by some other power; for I write only to
human beings.” Johnson, Idler No. 38 (January 6, 1759).
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For those who fortuitously survived their terms of incarceration, they recollected nothing contrary
to that; a life in squalor, where the stench of feces and the decay of human flesh loomed through
their dark cells wrought of pitted iron and reinforced with muted colored stone. Their treatment
within that institution was that equatable to that of feral animals, where their confiners would
induce living terror by way of sheer brutality and starvation. Indigent debtors were regarded by
these prison wards as indistinguishable from those imprisoned for “true” crimes, and many of these
debtors were forced to commingle with these felonious inmates or even housed in single cells
alongside them.
During the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, the population of incarcerated debtors was
around ten-thousand per annum and their numbers rose to become more than half the total
incarcerated population of England. See Stephen Ware, A 20th Century Debate About
Imprisonment for Debt, 54 Am. J. of Leg. Hist. 351, (July 2014). Social and political attention rose
as reformists and philosophers mounted an offensive against this “aberration” by virtue of moral
and Christian religious platforms, which appealed to returning decency to an immoral avenue for
creditor reconciliation. Promulgating the argument that reinterpreted the stance of debtors’
financial weaknesses as an aspect to pity and not to savagely punish, and that the current state-ofaffairs produced the “decadence” of society that agitated the greed from those who benefited from
debtors ignoble station, further pushed towards the inescapable recognition that human beings
should be treated with due fairness, given the bounds set by their Christian philosophy.
That dogma was directly responsible for the reformists theme that the human soul is an
item that is precious—they reasoned that it was an item of immeasurable value, so that no
quantifiable monetary value holds merit to its shackling. On a more secular plane, reformists
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further reasoned that incarcerating debtors was just simply poor execution of law and that those
incarcerated for debt are the consequence of financial “misfortune” rather than “malfeasance”;
under that standing law, both were deemed equally as culpable due to the vague perception of what
constituted criminality. Proponents for debtor incarceration reasoned that mishandling the property
of others was a form of “notorious conduct,” since one party caused a loss to another, and losing
another money implies some sort of wrongdoing. See Gustav Peebles, Washing Away the Sins of
Debt: The Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the Debtors' Prison, 55 Comparative Studies in
Society and History 701–724 (2013).
The overarching agenda of the reformists was to construct a system that would enable the
courts to determine the kind of culpability debtors faced and to practice it with impartiality.
Categorizing acts of fraud from “grievous culpability, the grievous from the mitigated culpability,
and this last from perfect innocence” allowed for the dividing line between true criminals and
simple debtors to be dissected, so that repugnant abuses to the system, like the filing of fraudulent
debt claims against innocent parties and sloppy fact-finding in unjustly expedited trials could be
curtailed. See Beccaria, Cesare, On Crimes and Punishments and other Writings, Bellamy, R., ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef, 90 (1995). Eventually, by the mid-to-late
nineteenth century, English law caught-up with popular demands that rightly recognized the
injustice so rampantly abhorred by the English citizenry. The Bankruptcy Act of 1869 stood as the
true cauterization for the wounds that have bled the literal life and liberty of the populace, stating
in section four of its decree that “no person shall, after the commencement of this Act, be arrested
or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money,” unless “fraudulent” grounds
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exist for nonpayment. See WALLACE THODAY, IMPRISONMENT BY JUSTICES FOR NON
PAYMENT OF MONEY, 5 (1936).
Contemporaneously, across the Atlantic, a budding nation also grappled with the
institutional management of debtors. The taint of debtor imprisonment did not halt at the borders
of England, as its colonial progeny embraced it as well. The development of debtors’ prison in the
United States, which relied upon the selfsame objectives and societal strife as our English
counterparts, played an intriguing ideological role in the development of American civil law.
Federally abolished in the first third of the nineteenth century, debtor relief came more than three
decades earlier than in England. See House Report, Abolish imprisonment for debt, 22nd Congress,
1st Session, January 17, 1832. Prior to that enactment, almost all the states failed to legally
recognize the civl liberties of the debtor and struggled with determining a humane means for
addressing indebtedness. It was by the precedent setting of New York legislators that the first
official round of debtor rights were addressed statutorily. The rest of the states followed suit
shortly. See New York State Legislature, An act to abolish imprisonment for debt, and to punish
fraudulent debtors, April 26, 1831.
During the active state of the former debtors’ prison, Pennsylvania is a state that
particularly comes to the fore when discussing collections laws, being that it was affected most by
English law largely because of the scope of its economy. Upon becoming a large mercantile hub
at around the time of the pre-revolutionary era, during the late seventeenth century, it was no
surprise that its development of creditor-debtor law arose as a response to the demands of a
booming economy. Merchants and lenders commonly faced delinquent accounts, in commercial
and consumer settings, when serving the needs of their community. In response to these unsatisfied

11

and disgruntled creditors, Pennsylvania’s general assembly enacted statutes to coerce debtors into
compliance and to determine terms of incarceration for debt, which later proved to be an inspiration
for the other American colonies seeking the redress of civil financial wrongs. Yet, even with these
early collections laws during pre-independence, Pennsylvania recognized that it was impractical
to perpetually detain debtors since they would foster little to no utility while incarcerated.
Therefore, to address the overarching aim of actually recompensing the creditor, Pennsylvania law
provided the debtor the opportunity to free himself, so that he may be released unto society under
a contract for indentured servitude. (Shaiman, S. Laurence, The History of Imprisonment for Debt
and Insolvency Laws in Pennsylvania as They Evolved from the Common Law, 4 The American
Journal of Legal History, 207-212 (1960.) This act of freeing the debtor, for the sake of debt
restitution, could be considered the forerunner of the “purge” in contemporary courts.
The ability to purge oneself, in the context of the civil judicial rules of procedure, is to free
oneself of judicial contempt, by legally exonerating the contemnor, the one who acted
contumaciously (willfully and wantonly disobedient), from the consequences of one’s actions. An
Order for Contempt is levied against an individual who fails to abide by the mandates of the court.
See 38.28, Fla. Stat. (2018). This is based on the redeeming act that the contemnor demonstrates,
specifically by taking an apologetic character for one’s disobedience and providing rectification
of the issue at contention in the contempt order. (See Fla. Fam. Law R. Proc. 12.615(e) (2019),
which demonstrates a general nature of the ability to purge.) The purge is the figurative key to the
aforementioned contemnor’s cell, as it is one of the final legal remedies available for those who
are subject to a civil contempt charge.
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The action of purge is in essence an aside from the order of contempt. The purge is not
applicable for those without the antecedent, the actual contempt order, granted by the presiding
judge in a trial. Like many of the foundational laws that have been derived from the English, the
American legal system also adopted the Contempt of Court from Common Law’s procedural rules.
That allowed for a sort of fluidity which enabled the flow of the substantive laws to be ingrained
within the court system by way of procedural facilitators, hence, procedural and substantive law
go hand-in-hand. Procedural law, roughly defined as concerns “the means and method to apply
and enforce those duties and rights,”; it is a resultant that is allowed by the myriad of vested rights
determined by the “Due Process” clause of the Fifth Amendment, and applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2002)(definition), U.S. Const.
amend. V (Due Processes scope) and U.S. Const. amend. XIV (applicability to the State).
Inversely, substantive law is defined by the Florida Supreme Court as the “part of the law
which creates, defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which courts are established to
administer.” See Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991). Given those
definitions, the Order for Contempt lies clearly within the procedural influence of the law. One
might question the merits of discussing the relevance of procedural law and its relation to the
history of the Contempt of Court Order. It is a tool that has been wielded as a means to obtain a
particular aim in the realm of all aspects of law—to induce compliance and mitigate the prospect
of disorder. Substantive law does not regulate the system itself, it merely establishes the boundaries
of law. The contempt enables the furtherance of law because it exists as a mechanism to provide a
means for the application of law within the court system itself, as previously mentioned. It can be

13

viewed analogous to theory of a particular branch of study (substantive law) and that of the actual
practice of that study (procedural law).
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III.

THE JUXTAPOSITION OF CONTEMPORARY CIVIL RENUMERATION

AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND
THEIR DICHOTOMOUS OBJECTIVES

It is widely recognized within the field of law that the aims of civil and criminal courts are
perpendicular to one another. Civil courts overarching aim is the pursuit of financial reconciliation
to the party who faced a wrongdoing, to return them to a station as similar as possible prior to the
occurrence of the wrongdoing. Criminal courts historically have imposed a retributivist agenda,
i.e., the criminal courts seek redress for committed wrongs not by compensation (civil agenda),
but by means of institutional retribution, since retribution appeals to the most innate satisfactions
of man’s character—redemption via the eye-for-an-eye or violence begets violence approach. See
Bronsteen, J., Buccafusco, C., & Masur, J., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1071
(2009). In the context of collections law, the dichotomous agendas of both civil and criminal courts
are not clearly defined.
In a civil case, if the wronged party merited a certain amount of justice, the courts would
valuate the harm and quantify it in dollars. In a criminal case, the courts would value the harm by
the wrongdoer and quantify justice in respect to a period of time that the wrongdoer must endure
incarceration. These are broad generalities, but they are essentially representative of what these
systems stand for in our society. So, why is it that if a debtor, in our modern society, fails to satisfy
a judgment would face incarceration? Is it not counterintuitive given the basic foundations of what
these systems are hinged upon? Of course, a reasonable person would argue that to ensure justice,
concessions must be made for an equitable solution. For instance, one might argue that the only
15

way to coerce disobedient debtors would be through a contempt order, accompanied with the
impending possibility of incarceration if they fail to abide by that order. Additionally, one might
also propose that without the contempt order, there would exist little inducement for debtors to
rectify their debts. At the heart of this issue, why legitimize compromises in civil liberties—the
unalienable right to be free from incarceration for debt—for the sake of procedural compliance?
One need not compromise in this limited circumstance in post-judgment recovery.
Since the abolishment of the debtors’ prisons, American law has plainly stated, via a variety
of sources and authorities, that no individual shall be subject to incarceration for debt. (See above,
Roman numeral number two of this analysis for particular references in history.) Although the
procedural mechanism, like the contempt of court, exists to further justice for one party, it is at the
ineludable expense of another’s liberty. There is no incarceration that is appropriate in the
circumstance of collections, regardless of the delay in satisfaction that the creditor might
potentially face. Incarceration should be reserved for criminal punishments, for those who are true
lawbreakers, not those who are indebted and subject to the contempt of court. In any issue unrelated
to the satisfaction of a judgment, arguments could be made for civil incarceration because they do
not have the issue of indebtedness and the aspect of imprisonment joined with one another.
Philosophically speaking, one may reason that because the judgment is the official
acknowledgment of a debt, any litigation prior to the (final) judgment is simply a matter at issue
and any debt existing prior to the judgment is not a legally recognized debt, ergo there can be no
legal punishment for failing to satisfy. Therefore, if a contempt charge was issued and pursued, for
say failure to produce requested documentation pre-judgment, then civil liberties would not be
infringed since the consequences of the contempt are not based on an officially recognized debt,
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but rather an avenue for attaining compliance from the party subject to the contempt. On the other
hand, if a (final) money judgment is rendered and the contempt is pursued, with the inevitable
consequence for incarceration following, the debtor would be imprisoned under a breach of his
civil liberties since that is an actual debt, subject to actual legal consequences. A debt without a
judgment would be a debt with no legal means for recovery, with exception to contacting the debtor
via telephonic or written means—dunning (demand) letters.
Moreover, dissatisfaction for the incarceration for debts has been hotly debated in the areas
of family and criminal law. These cases, like those relating to failures in not paying child support
monies, or repaying the courts for criminal fines and costs, are separate issues that are are related,
but not directly within the scope of this analysis. See Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (1983)
(incarceration for willful nonpayment of child support) and Bearden v. Ga., 461 U.S. 660 (1983)
(criminal court incarceration for failure to pay fine or fee). It can be reasoned that children, when
the financial supporter fails to remit monetary support, will face undue hardship; children’s
wellbeing supersedes any interests relative to the supporter’s since solely the children’s “best
interest” is considered in court’s determinations of law. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v.
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (best interest determination wielded throughout all
matters that involve a child).
When discussing situations like Bearden, one must consider that the debt at issue, i.e., the
fines or fees imposed by the courts, are sourced from criminal wrongdoing. Unlike the civil
counterpart discussed, the (wanton) criminal wrongdoer is not a party that faced unintended
misfortune. They are individuals who breached a tacitly ingrained covenant, by virtue of their
membership in their community, to remain free from illicit action. By breaching that implied
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covenant, the wrongdoer has degraded the social utility of that community and hence done a wrong
to all members, since the conduct of one reflects upon the integrity of many. This criminal also
harms that community’s economic utility, because the members are forced to pay the costs of the
trial.
It is thus not unreasonable to impose a bi-layered approach to punishment in this
circumstance—to incarcerate the criminal to mitigate further societal harm and to require
restitution for the harm caused to the community. In other words, it is expected, given
retributivism’s ideals, that if an individual is a purveyor of harm to others, they are required to
recompense in every manner available, to make the punishment suitable for the crime. For the civil
wrongdoer, when juxtaposed with the previous criminal wrongdoer, punishing the debtor via
imprisonment, along the concepts of retributivism, is an excessive punishment that does not fit the
harm done to society. Even if a civil claim has criminal underpinnings, like the platitudinal
circumstance of the civil trial of Orenthal James Simpson, the criminal courts exist to exert
institutional punishment, not the civil legal system—it must be seen as an instance worthy of
bifurcating both its criminal and civil natures. See Goldman v. Simpson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 731,
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008).
Although the incarceration issues of domestic relations and criminal court are related to the
focus of “pure” civil incarceration, they are not directly appropriate to the philosophies proposed.
These circumstances have contingent elements, children for family law and society for criminal
law, that are supreme to the inequities that the wrongdoer faces. In terms of valuation, by way of
utilitarian ideals, the collective’s wellbeing is placed higher than the wellbeing of the individual.
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The civil, post-judgment circumstance discussed varies from the former because its has no truly
justifiable basis aside from instilling inequitable harm to the civil unfortunate.
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SUMMATION

The lack of repaying debts and its relation to civil imprisonment is a matter of a rather
questionable nature. It has been widely accepted that no one individual or entity has a legal
obligation to repay their debts, strictly a moral or ethical obligation. But, by allowing pathways to
imprisonment, post-judgment, the civil system undermines itself, as the objectives of the criminal
courts are melded into the objectives of our civil courts. Unless a circumstance of fraud is found,
whether a debtor is insolvent, legally ignorant, or willfully disobedient in post-judgment
proceedings, the principles of freedom should be maintained over the desires of the civilly
vengeful. Debtors are not criminals, and because they are not criminals, they do not deserve the
possibility of imprisonment, as it is an aspect reserved to those who are contraveners of the law.
Imprisonment is not the only means for inducement. There exists many avenues for
creditors to obtain the records (or a debtor’s compliance) by more passive and humane
methodologies, like requesting the production of evidence from alternative sources, invoking
bankruptcy or using one of the varied execution actions available rather than strictly pursuing the
debtor to exhaustion. Levying imprisonment in civil post-judgment proceedings is not only against
the plainly written laws of our country, but it is a feeble and primitive method to resolve an issue
that has been reformed and debated to exhaustion within a timespan of over three centuries. As a
modern society, after this plentitude of time and continuously elevated legal philosophies are still
incapable of comprehending the fundamental principles that are vested within every one of us,
then little hope will exist for change in the realm of collections law. Shall the efforts of our
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forefathers be in vain? Shall personal financial gain be placed above the collective’s civil liberties?
Shall we further the interpretation of law in favor of those who seek to oppress?
I think not…
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